Abstract. CBC-MAC or cipher block chaining message authentication code is a well known method to generate message authentication code. Unfortunately, it is not forgery secure over arbitrary domain. There are several secure variants of CBC-MAC among which OMAC (or one-key CBC-MAC) is a widely used candidate. A simple variant of it called CMAC also has been recommended by NIST and is also used widely. Both of these cost (s+ 1) blockcipher invocations to authenticate an s-block message and it takes only one blockcipher key. In this paper we propose two secure and efficient variants of CBC-MAC. Our constructions cost only s blockcipher invocations to authenticate an s-block message (except for few single block messages, in which case it costs two blockcipher invocations like OMAC) and they need only one blockcipher key. If AES is plugged into these new constructions then they are significantly faster than OMAC for short messages, roughly twice faster for messages up to 125 bits and 1.5 times faster for messages up to 256 bits.
Introduction
In cryptography, a common trend is to design fast and secure algorithms. In this paper we propose two "so far fastest" and secure blockcipher based message authentication codes. A Message authentication code or MAC is useful in those applications where data integrity and authenticity are essential. In terms of security we want MAC to be a pseudorandom function or prf which means that it is computationally indistinguishable from an ideal random function. The prf-security is a strong security notion and it guarantees unforgeable securities of MAC. In this paper we use "secure" and "prf-secure" words synonymously. Till now several secure and fast authentication algorithms are known. We first broadly classify them into three main categories based on the underlying building blocks.
Hash-Mac: These are based on hash functions. HMAC [1] is widely used candidate in this class which also has been standardized by National Institute of Standards and Technology or NIST. The other efficient popular candidates are cascaded-PRF [2] , sandwich-MAC [24] , KMDP [14] etc. The prf security of these are proved under prf assumption of the underlying compression function (in some cases a stronger security assumption such as related key prf may be needed). Thus, it is also known as prf-preserving domain extension since we extend the domain of prf from a fixed size (domain of the keyed compression function) to an arbitrary domain (usually {0, 1} * ).
Universal Hash based Mac: Here universal hash functions and small domain pseudorandom functions are used. In software these are very fast for long messages [10, 21] . These generally cost field multiplications, key expansions, invocations of a smaller domain pseudorandom function etc. Thus, for short messages these may not always give similar performances. In [18] , 4 round-AES is used to obtain an universal hash functions which eventually produces a very fast MAC algorithm for long messages (close to two times faster than OMAC). Again it is much slower than OMAC due to overhead when we have one or two block messages.
Blockcipher based Mac: In this paper we study this category in more details. These are usually based on several invocations of a blockcipher either in feedback mode (cipher block chaining or cbc type) or in parallel mode (e.g., PMAC [8] , XOR-MAC [3] etc). A blockcipher is a permutation e K : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n for each key K chosen from the keyspace {0, 1} k where n (block size) and k (key size) are positive integers (we fix these parameters throughout the paper). Recently, blockciphers have been used extensively in many applications. Moreover, several fast and "till now secure" blockciphers are known e.g., AES [11] , RC6 [20] etc. Hence an authentication based on only blockcipher could be useful. The prf security of these are based on the "pseudorandom permutation" assumption of the underlying blockciphers meaning that the keyed blockcipher family is computationally indistinguishable from the ideal random permutation. CBC-MAC or cipher block chaining message authentication [4] is the first construction in this category. Now it is well known that CBC-MAC is not secure for variable length messages. Many different modifications of it have been proposed so far, among which OMAC [15] (or one-key CBC-MAC) and its variant CMAC [12] (NIST recommended) are efficient as well as requiring minimum key. Another simple modification called XCBC-MAC [9] or XCBC is faster in software but it needs three keys which may not be desired in many situations. These keys may be derived from one key at the cost of few blockcipher invocations which causes slower performance for short messages.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we first provide a general class of cbc type constructions called gcbc which includes almost all popularly known cbc type constructions. We also characterize prf-secure gcbc constructions and propose two so far fastest and secure candidates namely GCBC1 and GCBC2. We have implemented these with the blockcipher AES-128 in the platform Intel(R) Pentium(R) 4 CPU 3.60 GHz, 1GB RAM and provided a performance comparison in Table 1 . One can see that GCBC2 is twice faster than OMAC for almost all single block messages and both GCBC1 and GCBC2 are 1.5 times faster for all two block messages. This is understood from the fact that our constructions need s blockcipher invocations to authenticate s block messages whereas OMAC needs s + 1 blockcipher invocations. In nutshell, the two new proposed constructions are optimum among all generalized cbc type MAC in both keysize and the number of blockciphers and these are really useful in the applications where short message authentication is needed. Organization of the paper. We first provide basic definitions and notations and different cbc type MACs in section 2. In section 3, we propose a generalized cbc type message authentication algorithms and also show that most of the cbc type constructions belong to the class. The security analysis has been made by using decorrelation technique. The detail security analysis of generalized cbc type constructions is given in section 4. Finally in section 5, we specify two fast and secure construction called GCBC1 and GCBC2 from the generalized class.
Preliminaries

Definitions and Notations
+ is the set of all non-empty finite bit-sequences. We write |x| = i for any x ∈ {0, 1} i . Any X ∈ S + can be written as X = (x 1 , · · · , x i ) for some i ≥ 1 and
is a prefix of X if j ≤ i and y 1 = x 1 , · · · , y j = x j . Trivially λ is prefix of any X and we call it a trivial prefix. Any other prefixes will be called non-trivial prefixes. Let x = x 1 x 2 · · · x n ∈ {0, 1} n , x i ∈ {0, 1}, then for any two integers i ≤ j we denote the set {i, i + 1, · · · , j } as [i.
.j] and we denote
.j] is nothing but λ. To represent the ith bit of x we simply write x[i].
Given any set S, we write S + = i=1 S i and S * = i=0 S i = S + ∪ {λ} where λ is the empty string. For
«t
We use x (or x »t ) to denote t-bit left shift (or right shift respectively) of an n-bit string x. We identify n−1 + · {0, 1} n as GF(2 n ) by fixing a primitive polynomial z n + c 1 z · · + c n−1 z + c n where c i ∈ {0, 1}. Let 0 n = 0 (the additive identity), 0 n−1 1 = 1 (multiplicative identity) and α = 0 n−2 10 ∈ GF(2 n ) (known as a primitive element). For any element x ∈ {0, 1} n , the field multiplication with α is denoted as α · x and it can * «1 be computed as
We denote x ← S to mean that x is chosen uniformly from the set S and it is independently chosen from all other previously described distributions.
Definition 1.
(ideal random function and ideal random permutation) ρ is said to be an ideal random function from M to {0,
n ) q for any q > 0. In other words, for any q elements
Similarly τ is said to be an ideal random permutation on {0, 1} n if for any distinct x 1 , · · · , x q ∈ {0, 1} n and distinct y 1 , · · · , y q ∈ {0, 1} n we have
When M is a finite set there is an alternative way to view an ideal random function. Let Func(M, {0, 1} n ) denote the set of all functions from M to {0, 1} n . We denote the set of all functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} n as Func(n, n). Now an ideal random function from M to {0, 1} n is chosen uniformly from Func(M, {0, 1} n ) (it is not possible when M is an infinite set). It is an equivalent definition as one can show that
for any distinct m 1 , · · · , m q ∈ M and any y 1 , · · · , y q ∈ {0, 1} n . We may write an ideal random function as keyed function family rand ρ where rand ρ (x) = ρ(x) and ρ ∈ Func(M, {0, 1} n ). A blockcipher e : {0,
n → {0, 1} n such that for any key K ∈ {0, 1} k , e K := e(K, ·) is a permutation on {0, 1} n . In this paper we fix n and any element x ∈ {0, 1} i is called block if i ≤ n. It is called complete if i = n, otherwise called incomplete. For any x ∈ {0, 1} * , we denote l |x| l as ||x|| called number of blocks of x. Let A be an oracle n adversary. We say A is a q-adversary if it makes at mostueries and we say it is a (q, σ)-adversary if it makes at mostueries and the total number of blocks in all queries is at most σ. For simplicity we assume that a q-adversary makes exactlyueries as there is no loss making some extra dummy queries. We say q as number of input queries whereas σ as number of block-queries.
Definition 2.
(pseudo random function) Let F K ' be a keyed function family where
n for a message space M. Now for any probabilistic oracle adversary A we define the prf-advantage of it over the function family F as *
where ρ is an ideal random function from M to {0, 1} n and the probabilities are computed over internal ' randomness of A, uniform distribution of K and randomness of output behavior of ρ. When M = {0, 1} n we can equivalently compute the prf-advantage as * *
The prf-advantage of F is defined as Adv prf (q, σ) = max A Adv prf (A) where maximum is taken over all
n we have σ = q and hence we also write Adv prf (σ). We say a 
where the probabilities are computed over internal randomness of A, uniform distribution of K and ran domness of the ideal random permutation τ on {0, 1} n . The prp-advantage of the blockcipher e is defined as
where maximum is taken over all q-adversaries A. 
The proof of the switching lemma can be found in many literatures, e.g. [6] .
Known Examples of CBC Type MAC Algorithms
For any integer
£ , an initial value iv ∈ {0, 1} n and a permu tation π ∈ Perm(n), we define π
The initial value iv can be chosen publicly (i.e., a fixed constant), or kept secret, or it can be the internal state.
1 When iv is a fixed constant, we choose iv = 0 (a sequence of 0-bits of size n) unless it's value is clearly mentioned. We write π
n . For a binary string x of 0 size at most n, we denote xd10
So x has size exactly n for any x with 0 ≤ |x| ≤ n.
and |m s | = r with 1 ≤ r ≤ n. Then each m i is said to be a block of the message. Note that m s or the final message block can be either a complete (if r = n) or an incomplete block (if r < n). Unless we precisely mention we use the above representation of a message m with the variables s and r as stated above.
+
Informally a construction, which uses e function as a major component given a blockcipher e, is called K cbc-type construction (see equation 1 with π = e K and iv = 0). There are several cbc-type constructions. We study some of these here.
CBC-MAC[4]
: Given any message m and a blockcipher e K with a secret key K, output of CBC-MAC is + defined as cbc-mac e K (m) = e (m10 d ) where d is the smallest nonnegative integer such that |m| + 1 + d is K multiple of n. In [4, 5] , it was shown that CBC-MAC is a prefix-free pseudorandom function (attacker is not 1 internal state usually is updated in each computation and the currently used state should be transmitted along with other outputs
allowed to choose queries m and m such that m = mdx or m is a prefix of m ' ) provided the underlying blockcipher is pseudorandom permutation. Moreover, there is an efficient distinguisher which can distinguish CBC-MAC from an ideal random function by making only two adaptive queries (definitely one of these has to be a prefix to the other). In particular, the following equation 2 holds with probability one when f = cbc-mac e K for any key K, but with negligible probability for the ideal random function f .
Since we do not have prefixes among fixed size inputs, CBC-MAC restricted on fixed size input is always a pseudorandom function. But for almost all practical purposes we need a pseudorandom function over arbitrary domain. Prepending length of the message is one possible way out [4] in which case, either the length of the the messages should be known in prior or we have to store the complete message in buffer before starting underlying blockcipher invocation.
XCBC [9] : To avoid the above mentioned problem, a prf-secure XCBC [9] was proposed.
n be three independently chosen keys. Now we define
K TMAC [17] and OMAC [15] : Note that XCBC needs three keys which may be expensive in some applications where a small key is desired. Keeping it in mind, TMAC or two-key CBC-MAC and OMAC or one-key CBC MAC have been proposed. Here the two keys L 0 and L 1 are generated from either a single key L or e K (0). Let α be a primitive element of the Galois field of size 2 n . Then output of these authentication codes are defined as follows:
In [17, 15, 16] , they were shown to be prf. Among all these above constructions, OMAC is one of the good choice in terms of efficiency and key-size. It has been used in EAX [7] (a secure authenticated en cryption), TET [13] (a length-preserving tweakable strong pseudo random permutation) and many others. A simple variant of it also has been recommended by NIST. In the next section we propose a class of message authentication codes which are significantly faster than OMAC for short messages.
3 Generalized CBC-MAC Class
Building blocks
Every MAC for a message space M has two main components namely a randomized key-generation algorithm and a tag-generation which may be deterministic or probabilistic. Key-generation algorithm returns a key (K, L) at random from it's keyspace K × {0, 1}
£ . In this paper we consider deterministic tag-generation algorithms which have the following three main building blocks.
Padding Rule. A padding rule pad : M → ([0, t] × {0, 1} n ) + which ensures that the padded message is in a particular form. The non-negative integer t is said to be the variation number. Given a message m, the padded message pad(m) = X will be written as ((δ 1 , x 1 ) , · · · , (δ s , x s )) for some positive integer s, x i ∈ {0, 1} n and δ i ∈ [0, t], 1 ≤ i ≤ s. We denote the set of all possible δ 1 values as
The roll of x i 's is similar to the message block of cbc whereas δ i values take part to tweak the intermediate outputs of the blockcipher by using a variation operation (which is one of the building blocks). A padding ' rule pad is said to be prefix-free if for any m , pad(m) is not prefix of pad(m ' ). = m Iterative Function. An underlying iterative function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n which is determined via a * key K ∈ K. A blockcipher e K or an ideal random function rand ρ for ρ ← Func(n, n) (note, rand ρ (x) = ρ(x)) are different examples of iterative functions.
Variation Operation. A t-variate variation operation is a function h : [0.
.t] × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n such that h(0, x) = x. These operations are usually very efficiently computable simple functions. It may be determined via a key L called auxiliary key and use the underlying iterative function f as a subroutine (in this way it may be determined by the key K of f ). In this case we say it is a secret variation operation. If it does not use f and any auxiliary key L then h is publicly computable function and we say that it is a public variation operation. A simple example of t-variate public variation operation is
It is called type-1 secret variation operation if it only depends on the auxiliary key and not on the underlying iterative function f . All other secret variation operations are called type-2. In this paper we consider public or type-1 secret variation operations when we study the security analysis of generalized cbc constructions. But we also see some secure constructions such as OMAC or CMAC which use type-2 secret variation operations. Now we define a class of generalized cbc message authentication algorithms denoted as C gcbc . Any authen tication algorithm from the class for a message space M has two main functionalities namely a randomized key-generation algorithm or Key-Gen with a keyspace K×{0, 1}
Definition of a Generalized CBC-MAC
£ and a deterministic tag-generation algorithm gcbc f,h,pad (defined below). *
£ is the keyspace. So key-generation is parameterized by the keyspace only.
gcbc
f,h,pad : The tag-generation algorithm for a message space M uses three subroutines viz.,
n → {0, 1} n and -an underlying iterative function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n .
These subroutines except the padding rule pad are specified by the key (K, L) (output of Key-Gen) where K is the key for the underlying iterative function f and L is the auxiliary key which is used for secret variation operation h. For public variation operation £ = 0. Now for any message m we define gcbc f,h,pad (m) = v s where v s is computed as follows (also described in Algorithm 1 and illustrated in Figure 1) ;
where
In nutshell, to define an authentication algorithm we need to specify the keyspace K × {0, 1} £ (the value of £, may be zero and the set K), a message space M, the underlying iterative operation f , a t-variate variation operation h and a padding rule with variation number t. The only randomness of the generalized cbc comes from the key (K, L) and hence we denote the authentication algorithm as gcbc K,L whenever all the above are clear from the context.
Remark 1. An efficiency of tag-generation algorithm gcbc
f,h,pad depends on the number of invocations of f , as the underlying iterative function is the most costly operation (we also desire a strong security notion from it such as pseudorandom function). Note that the number of invocations of f is at least s and it may be more if we use type-2 secret variation operation. To keep it small, we should carefully design a padding rule which gives the value of s as small as possible. The padding rule and the variation operations (except the computation of f which may be used in h) are usually very cheap and hence we mostly focus on the number of invocations of f when we compare the performance of different constructions.
Algorithm 1 Generalized Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication
Require:
key. KiL ∈ K × {0, 1} £ . \\ an output of key generation algorithm Key-Gen \\ which are used in the functions f and h function. f : {0,
vj = f (uj ) 7: end for 8: return v s
Known CBC type MACs are Generalized CBC
This class is indeed a generalized class as it contains almost all cbc type authentication algorithms. Now we describe more precisely how these following popular candidates XCBC, TMAC and OMAC belong to the class. A common choice of the underlying iterative function is a blockcipher e K , K ∈ K = {0, 1} k and a common choice of padding rule pad is described below. Given a message m = m 1 d · · · dm s−1 dm s with m 1 , · · · , m s−1 ∈ {0, 1} n , m s ∈ {0, 1} r , 1 ≤ r ≤ n, the padding rule with two variation number is defined as
where δ = 1 if r < n, otherwise we set δ = 2. So it remains to define the value of £ and 2-variate variation operations h which are described below for each constructions. Recall that key generation algorithm returns
n and i = 1, 2. TMAC: Let £ = n and define h(i, x) = x ⊕ (L · α i−1 ) ∀x ∈ {0, 1} n and i = 1, 2 where α is a primitive element and α 0 = 1 (multiplicative identity). OMAC: Let £ = 0 and define h(0, x) = x and h(i, x) = x ⊕ (e K (0) · α i ) ∀x ∈ {0, 1} n and i = 1, 2.
Remark 2. The OMAC is an example where the variation operation is type-2 secret. In the case of the other two examples the variation operations are type-1 secret variation operations. In the next section we propose two different padding rules and two public variation operations. Usage of public variation operations help to keep the key size lowest possible. We also see these public variation operations are efficiently computable. We should be careful in security analysis when we choose a public variation operation since the security analysis is not straightforward.
Security Analysis
Decorrelation Technique
We state Vaudeney's decorrelation theorem (Lemma 22 of [23] 2 ). Based on our notations, we state the following version of decorrelation theorem.
Theorem 1. (Decorrelation Theorem)
' Let q and σ be two fixed integers and let
n be a family of functions indexed by key K chosen uniformly from the keyspace K ' . Suppose the following holds for some positive real numbers e 1 and e 2 ;
C1. there exists a subset Y ⊆ ({0, 1}
n ) q such that |Y | ≥ 2 nq (1 − e 1 ) and *
C2. Pr[F
Then for any distinguisher A which asksueries with σ many blocks present in all queries, Adv
What does Decorrelation Theorem mean? The second condition C2 means that the output behavior of the function family is close to that of an ideal random function when the output-tuple (
The first condition means that with high probability the output-tuple of the ideal random function are from Y. So the given conditions say eventually that the output probability distribution of the function family for any set of q inputs are almost identical with that of an ideal random function. So prf-advantage of a (q, σ)-adversary should be small independent of how adversary works. Note that adversary at the end of query-responses has a set of inputs and outputs and he has to distinguish based on it. However the values of e 1 and e 2 can depend on q and σ. What is the difference from the game-based approach? Conceptually the decorrelation theorem corresponds to the game-based reductions [22, 6] . In the game-based reductions, the response of function family are viewed as a game say G 0 . The function family game is modified sequentially into the ideal function family game G t (or in the other direction) via some intermediate games. Now it is usually shown that the games G 0 and G t are equivalent given that some bad event bad does not occur and hence the distinguishing advantage is bounded by Pr[bad]. The rest is devoted to compute the probability. In the decorrelation technique, there are two bad events bad 1 , the output tuple (y 1 , · · · , y q ) ∈ Y and bad 2 (depending on the
It is easy to see that C1 is true with e 1 = Pr ρ [bad 1 ] = 2 nq . The second bad event would help us to find a bound of the form
which would eventually provide the second condition C2 with e 2 = Pr K [bad 2 ]. Now we can use decorrelation theorem to bound the prf-advantage. Decorelation technique has advantage over game based technique as it involves only probability computation which can be verified from the basic knowledge of probability theory.
The value of e 1 . Now we describe the set Y which is going to be used throughout the paper. In fact, it is the most common choice. It is the set of all q-tuples which contain all q distinct elements.
Now it is easy to see that
The value of e 1 does not depend on the construction F K as we compute the probability over random function ρ.
Security Analysis of Generalized CBC Algorithm
A variation operation can be public or secret. A variation operation is said to be allowed if either it is public or it is type-1 secret (which does not use underlying iterative as a subroutine and only uses an auxiliary key).
Definition 4. An al lowed t-variate variation operation
n is said to be a (e, Δ)-xor weak universal operation if for any 0 ≤ δ = δ ' ≤ t, c ∈ {0, 1} n and for all auxiliary key L 0 ∈ {0, 1} £ the following conditions are satisfied.
Note that when Δ is a singleton set then the condition W2 is vacuously true. Now we characterize generalized cbc constructions which are prf-secure. Let pad be a prefix-free padding rule with a variation number t ≥ 0, h be a (e, Δ pad )-xor weak universal allowed variation operation and the underlying iterative function family (f K ) K∈K is (σ, µ)-prf. Then we show that the generalized cbc based on the above such building blocks is (q, σ, e)-prf where e = σ ' (σ ' − 1) × (e + 1 ) + q(q−1) where σ ' denote the total number of
blocks in all q padded messages (which have been queried by an adversary). Later we propose two padding rules where the the number of block can only increase by one for each message and hence σ ' ≤ σ + q. Now we try to compute e 2 in the condition C2 of the decorrelation theorem for the function family gcbc ρ,L where the above underlying function family (f K ) K∈K is replaced by an ideal random function family (rand ρ ) ρ∈Func(n,n) . More precisely for distinct m 1 , · · · , m q ∈ M and distinct y 1 , · · · , y q ∈ {0, 1} n we want to compute
where probability is computed over (ρ, L) ← Func(n, n) × {0, 1} £ . We first introduce some notations which are needed to compute the above probability. 
Note that all these variables u i,j , v i,j are random variables whereas δ i,j , x i,j are fixed constants. Moreover,
The following lemma is easy to prove by looking at the above u i 's and v i 's sequences and the definition of X i,j .
,j ' with probability 1.
Let σ 1 be the maximum number of all pairs (i, j ) with distinct X i,j 's. More precisely,
Proof. This is true since for given any such admissible tuple,
Lemma 4. The number of admissible tuples is at least 2
n , V i,si = y i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ q. Now we need to find estimate of number of tuples among these such that
To do so we count the complement. Suppose for some i, j, i
The number of such tuple is at most 2 nσ1+£−1 since h is a weakly (e, Δ pad 1 )-xor universal variation operation.
σ1
The total number of possible values of i, j, i
. Subtracting all such non 2 admissible tuples we see that there are at least 2 nσ1 +£ (1 − wσ1(σ1+1) ) admissible tuples.
2
Combining above two lemmas we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let h be a weakly (e, Δ pad )-xor universal operation and pad be a prefix-free padding rule. Sup pose the underlying iterative function is an ideal random function (rand ρ ) ρ∈Func(n,n) and we denote the corre sponding generalized cbc authentication algorithm as gcbc ρ,L . Now let σ ' be the largest number of blocks after padding q messages having at most σ many blocks in total. Then for any distinct q inputs m 1 , · · · , m q ∈ M (message space) and any q outputs y 1 , · · · , y q ∈ {0, 1} n ,
Theorem 3. Based on all notations defined so far we have,
5 Two New Efficient Generalized CBC : GCBC1 and GCBC2
In this section we propose two secure generalized cbc constructions namely GCBC1 and GCBC2. The first construction called GCBC1 which has message space {0, 1} >n and it's tag-generation algorithm costs only s blockcipher invocations for any s-block messages, s ≥ 2. If we pad enough bits so that every padded messages has at least two blocks then it can have message space {0, 1} * . We call this variant GCBC1 ' . This variant costs 2 blockcipher invocations for one block messages (same as OMAC) and costs s blockcipher invocations for s-block messages (still one less).
The second construction called GCBC2 has message space {0, 1} * . The padding rule of it has been defined carefully so that it costs one blockcipher for almost all single block messages (for all messages with bit size at most n − 4). The variation operation is also very fast in software which needs at most three 8-bit shift operations. Note that a 8-bit implementation of single shift on 128 bit needs 16 shift operations. For example, if we use AES then a single shift on 128 bit (it is partitioned into 16 8-bits) requires 16 shift operations and several bitwise-and, bitwise-or operations.
m ∈ {0, 1} * .
1: divide m as (m1, · · · , ms−1, ms) where m1, · · · , ms−1 ∈ {0, 1} n , ms ∈ {0, 1} r , 1 ≤ r ≤ n. where δ = 1 if r < n, otherwise δ = 2. We extend the definition of the padding rule to the message space {0, 1} * as follows. Let m 1 ∈ {0, 1} r , define Thus, s-block messages have s-block padded messages for all s ≥ 2 and one-block messages have two-block padded messages. It is also easy to observe that Δ pad 1 = {0}. Moreover, the padding rule is prefix-free.
Proposition 1. The padding rule pad 1 over the message space {0, 1} * is a prefix-free padding rule. to see that they can be equal only when m 1 = m and hence m = m .
1
Now we define a simple public variation operation ls which has two variations. For any x ∈ {0, 1} n and «δ 0 ≤ δ ≤ 2, ls(δ, x) = x .
Proposition 2. The operation ls with 2 variations is a public and weakly 2 n−2 -xor universal for Δ = Δ pad 1 = {0}.
«i Proof. By definition, ls(0, x) = x. Now it is easy to see that x = c has at most 4 solutions of x for any i ≤ 2 and any constant c ∈ {0, 1} n . So condition W1 holds. The condition W2 trivially holds since Δ = Δ 1 = {0}.
«1
To see the condition W3 we first prove that the number of solutions of x ⊕ x = c is exactly one for any constant c ∈ {0, 1} n . In fact, the solution is 
«2
Similarly one can see that the number of solutions of x for the equation x ⊕ x = c is exactly one. Now
«2 «
we want to find the number of solutions of the equation x «1 ⊕ x = c. Let y = x 1 then we have exactly one solution of y and hence there are exactly two solutions of x. Combining all these observations we can 1 see that condition W3 is true. Thus, ls is a weakly 2 n−2 -xor universal.
Let e be a blockcipher then we define the tag-generation algorithm of GCBC1 as the generalized cbc algorithm (see Figure 2) gcbc e,ls,pad with message space {0, 1} >n . If we consider the message space {0, 1} * and choose the extended definition of the padding rule pad 1 then we obtain a variant of GCBC1 called GCBC1 Proof. We apply the result of the above two propositions to the generalized cbc security bound (see Theo rem 3).
